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PREFACE 
 
In the fall of 2008 when I was a junior at Peking University, I attended a lecture series 
directed by Dr. Melville Y. Stewart on science and religion. Guest lecturers Dr. Alvin 
Plantinga, Dr. William L. Craig and Dr. Bruce Reichenbach have influenced my 
thinking on the relation between evolution and faith. In the fall of 2010 when I 
became a one-year visiting student at Calvin College in Michigan, I took a seminar 
directed by Dr. Kelly J. Clark on evolution and ethics. Having thought about 
evolution/faith and evolution/ethics, I signed up for Dr. Irem K. Steen’s natural kind 
seminar which had a focus on evolution and essentialism in the fall of 2011 when I 
became a graduate student at UMSL. 
This initiated the present project. In the seminar I studied various arguments 
from new biological essentialists against evolutionary theorists. While contemporary 
discussions are flourishing under the assumption that an essence is an essential 
property, I thought that Aristotle’s original conception of essence might be different 
and might move the debate forward even more. I tried to see whether Aristotle has 
theoretical resources to respond to the vagueness problem in philosophy of species. I 
wish I could expand more on the significance of Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes.  
I took Dr. Jon McGinnis’ Aristotle seminar in the spring of 2012. There I 
studied Aristotle’s metaphysics more extensively, especially how his hylomorphism 
shapes his conception of essence. By this time I realized that Aristotle may not 
endorse the property essentialism favored by new biological essentialists. Given the 
causal and explanatory priority Aristotle ascribes to essence, I suspended property 
essentialism and tried to develop an alternative conception of essentialism. To explore 
the tension between Aristotle’s essentialism and species evolution, I wrote a term 
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paper in which I reached an agnostic position regarding what initiates a change in the 
potentiality of matter. I wish I could examine deeper the tension between Aristotelian 
natural teleology and evolution. 
 In the fall of 2010 I did a research paper on evolution and natural teleology in 
Dr. Andrew Black’s class philosophy of science. I struggled with whether Aristotle’s 
teleology of individual organisms is compatible with the randomness of evolution, 
and whether Aristotle would think that evolution as a whole has a purpose. In my 
paper I forced myself to draw a distinction between two senses of nature which I now 
dislike because of its artificiality. I wish I could incorporate Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
unmoved mover into my thinking. 
 When I started drafting a thesis on the relation between Aristotelian 
essentialism and species evolution, the biggest challenge is the paucity of literature. 
Many have written on Aristotle’s metaphysics and philosophy of biology; many have 
written on evolution. Few have built a dialogue between the two. At the start this 
made it hard for me to see what the problem is. Books I found particularly helpful in 
forging connections are Allan Gotthelf’s Teleology, First Principles and Scientific 
Method in Aristotle’s Biology; David Charles’ Aristotle on Meaning and Essence; 
James Lennox’s Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology; Michail Peramatzis’ Priority in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics; Jeremy Kirby’s Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Form, Matter and 
Identity; Michael Ruse’s edited Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology; Ernest 
Nagel’s Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of 
Science. I have not been able, however, to digest Mariska Leunissen’s scholarship 
Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature and John Dudley’s 
scholarship Aristotle’s Concept of Chance. I wish the limitations resulting from my 
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ignorance of their insightful perspectives will not become too big a hindrance to the 
readers’ appreciation of the depth of the problem at hand. 
 This intellectual journey never lacks sphinxes and solitude. It is a normality to 
read articles after articles and books after books without being able to locate even one 
piece of information that is sensitive enough to my problem. I ended up gleaning 
flashes of insight in the literature that speak directly to my problem. Then I would try 
developing those insights into arguments to be used. The comfort is that this 
challenging yet creative writing experience has conferred me courage and cheers. 
 I am extremely grateful for the philosophy department at UMSL, which has 
academically and financially supported my education. I have been incredibly 
fortunate to have intelligent and invaluable feedback from Dr. Jon McGinnis, who has 
engaged me in extended talks and encouraged me in earnest thinking. I would like to 
thank my professors Dr. Eric Wiland, Dr. John Brunero, Dr. Andrew Black and Dr. 
Berit Brogaard, who have shaped my philosophical pilgrim. I owe my thanks to the 
philosophy department’s administrative associate Mrs. Nora Hendren, who has 
breathed the enduring words of wisdom for my study and life.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I argue that Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with species 
evolution. My argument has two premises: (1) Aristotelian essentialism can describe 
what is going on with species evolution; (2) If Aristotelian essentialism can describe 
what is going on with species evolution, Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with 
species evolution. 
 To support my first premise, I suspend “property essentialism” and develop a 
teleological conception of Aristotelian essentialism in terms of matter and form as 
potentiality and actuality. I propose and explicate my “multiple-potentiality strategy” 
that matter has multiple potentialities. I apply this strategy to describe what is going 
on with species evolution. I draw a distinction between proximate potentiality and 
remote potentiality. To support my second premise, I refute the argument from non-
actuality, the argument from randomness and the argument from functional 
reducibility. 
 I also show the inadequacy of the argument from goal-directedness, the 
argument from wellbeing and the argument from discernibility, all of which seem to 
count in favor of Aristotelian essentialism. I argue that my multiple-potentiality 
strategy can enhance these arguments. 
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Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited 
 
Introduction 
“One of the most important things we have learned from Darwin (but some 
philosophers, alas, still don’t get it),” says Daniel Dennett, “is that essentialism is 
simply a mistake” (2011:475). “If to continue a species is to continue replicating its 
form,” James Lennox explains, “it does entail fixity” (2001:155). Elliott Sober 
contends, “essentialism about species is … a dead issue” (1980:249). Indeed, an 
“evolving essence” sounds absurd (Richard 2010:75).  
New biological essentialists have tried to rescue essentialism. Richard Boyd 
claims that an essential property need be neither necessary nor sufficient for species 
membership. A property is essential if it belongs to a “homeostatic property cluster” 
(1999:1). Samir Okasha asserts that Darwinian evolution rejects intrinsic essentialism 
yet reserves relational essentialism (2002:191). An organism has species membership 
by interbreeding with other species members. Michael Devitt distinguishes the “taxon 
problem” from the “category problem” (2008:344),1 and says that there are intrinsic 
essential properties if some “indeterminacy” is allowed (Devitt 2008:373). Yet new 
biological essentialists all assume that an essence is an essential property.
2
 
                                                          
1
 The taxon problem is “what makes an organism an F?” The category problem is “what makes a group 
of Fs a species?” 
2
 All attempts have received criticism. Take Okasha’s relational essentialism for example. It cannot 
explain law-like generalizations biologists make based on intrinsic properties. Merely saying a zebra 
interbreeds with another zebra does not offer an explanation of law-like generalizations such as “zebras 
have stripes” (Ereshefsky 2010). Interbreeding also fails to report the nature of a species. Even if it 
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In this paper I want to show that Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with 
species evolution without assuming “property essentialism.” Aristotle did not 
entertain the idea of evolution, which would have appeared to him a “wild 
cosmological speculation” (Lennox 2001:178). Yet David Balme says, “there is 
nothing in Aristotle’s theory to prevent an ‘evolution of species,’ i.e., a continuous 
modification of the kinds being transmitted” (1972:97). Given that much of 
Aristotle’s work in biology “has stood the test of time” (O’Rourke 2004:7), it is 
worthwhile to see how he might accommodate species evolution. 
In Chapter One “Situating the Puzzle,” I begin by recapping Charles Darwin’s 
Origin and posing the leading question of our inquiry. Then I review Aristotle’s 
distinction between accidental change and substantial change, and claim that species 
evolution involves the latter. Contra “property essentialists,” I argue that the 
Aristotelian essence of a living thing is not an essential property of the living thing, 
but rather the formal nature of the living thing. I urge that Aristotelian essences of 
species are ontologically and biologically dependent upon matter. I formulate 
Aristotle’s essentialism in terms of matter and form as potentiality and actuality. 
In Chapter Two “Stating the Proposal,” I offer my key to resolve the tension 
between Aristotelian essentialism and species evolution. This key––multiple-
potentiality strategy––is explained and applied to answer our leading question posed 
in the beginning. Then I offer my compatibility argument—the central argument of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
tells us what makes a group of organisms one species, it does not tell us “in virtue of what” a species is 
a species of F instead of a species of G (Devitt 2008). 
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this paper—and draw a distinction between “proximate potentiality” and “remote 
potentiality” to defend the first premise.  
In Chapter Three “Striking the Prosecutors,” I examine the plausibility of the 
second premise in my compatibility argument. I differentiate two senses of 
compatibility on which the consequent of this premise can be read. I concede that the 
premise can be non-trivially true only if it works with the strong sense of 
compatibility. I will consider and counter arguments that count against the strong 
reading of the second premise. These arguments are the argument from non-actuality, 
the argument from normativity, the argument from randomness and the argument 
from functional reducibility. This critiquing process will show that the second 
premise in my central argument is very probable. 
In Chapter Four “Stimulating the Protectors,” I show the inadequacy of 
alternative arguments in support of my compatibility thesis. Arguments I examine 
include the argument from goal-directedness, the argument from wellbeing and the 
argument from discernibility. I show how my multiple-potentiality strategy can 
enhance these arguments. This is to provoke protectors of my compatibility thesis to 
move beyond their approaches and see the significance of my proposal. 
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Chapter One: Situating the Puzzle 
A. Darwinian Evolution 
According to Darwin, limitations of resources in the natural environment make the 
struggle for existence, both across and within species, the driving force of evolution 
(2009:65).
3
 Without the struggle for existence population growth will be unchecked. 
Elephants, one of the slowest reproducing animals, can populate the earth by fifteen 
million in 500 years (2009:67). While mutations and variations in traits or phenotypic 
properties randomly occur without attending to the needs of organisms, certain novel 
traits are beneficial in the struggle for existence (2009:50). Individuals with greater 
fitness are more likely to survive and reproduce. Mechanisms of inheritance pass 
beneficial traits onto descendents (2009:64;84-86;106;159). Natural selection is the 
principle by which beneficial traits are preserved. Descendants from a common 
species can become increasingly divergent in traits and eventually different species 
(2009:112-115).
4
 How can successive changes in traits of species members generate a 
change in the essence of a species? Let this be our leading question.  
 
                                                          
3
 Various attempts have been made to refine Charles Darwin’s main point in Origin (Ruse 1975; 
Thagard 1978; Lloyd 1983; Recker 1987; Kitcher 1985; Waters 1986; Sintonen 1990; Hodge, 1992). 
4
 There is a debate over whether the unit of evolution is individuals or species (Brigandt 2009:82,85; 
Sober 1980:370; Walsh 2006:433-434; Fisher 1930; Wright 1931; Hodge 1992; Morrison 2000). We 
need not enter this debate because it is a debate over epistemological contexts and pragmatic interests 
rather than metaphysical principles (Brigandt 2009:86; Dupré 1999). 
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B. Accidental and Substantial Change 
Since evolution is a type of change, what is Aristotle’s view on change?5 Aristotle 
thinks that change is real and divisible into two kinds (Coope 2009:277). Firstly, there 
is accidental change––the “alteration” of properties of an object. Accidental change 
can happen, for instance, to quality (Chameleon from dark to bright) or quantity 
(Simmias from three-feet tall to five-feet tall). In an accidental change the “contraries” 
are “replaced” while the substance persists (Cohen 2009: 13; Met. XII. 2, 1069b3-9).  
Secondly, there is substantial change––the “generation/destruction” of an 
object (Phys. III.1 200
b
33–4). A substantial change happens, for instance, when a 
bronze statue comes into being out of a lump of bronze, a house out of woods and 
bricks, or an oak out of an acorn. Since a statue comes not from the “contrary” of a 
statue (Catg. 3
b
24), substantial changes do not happen on the level of opposite 
properties (Cohen 2009:7).  
Yet Aristotle rejects the idea that nothing persists in a substantial change (GC 
317
a
33-317
b
6). “Substances … also come to be from some underlying thing … 
[T]here is always something which underlies what comes to be” (Phys. 190a32-b5). If 
nothing at all persists through substantial changes, any change through which 
something does persist can only be deemed accidental (Cohen 2009:12). Since a lump 
of bronze underlies a change by which a bronze statue is generated, it could be argued 
                                                          
5
 Although several Aristotelian concepts – substances, matter, form, essence - may seem helpful, 
pertinent exegetical problems are many and huge. Rather than carving out the “exegetical space” and 
engaging in exegetical debates (Fine 2001:14), I will make “interpretive decisions” where it is 
necessary (Kirby 2008:8). 
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that the lump of bronze undergoes merely an accidental change by gaining the 
property of “being a statue” (GC 317b17-19). 
To defend the distinction between two kinds of changes, Aristotle 
distinguishes substantial forms from accidental forms (Oderberg 2011:94). The form 
of statue that a lump of bronze takes on is substantial, because it unifies a lump of 
bronze into a statue. The form of “being tanned” that Socrates takes on is accidental, 
because it does not unify Socrates into Socrates. “Something is a definite thing rather 
than a heap,” Catherine J. Deavel says, “because the form unifies the matter as a 
substance … [T]he form is the cause of the unity of definite things” (2003:167). 
Given the difference between substantial and accidental forms involved in changes, 
the distinction between two kinds of changes is robust.  
Accidental changes allow a further division because there are two kinds of 
accidents. Consider three features of Socrates: (1) being rational; (2) being able to 
learn grammar; (3) being pale. According to Aristotle, “being pale” is a non-
necessary accident of Socrates, because Socrates is still Socrates even if he is not pale. 
“Being rational” is part of the essence of Socrates (Durrant 1975:596). Although 
“being able to learn grammar” is an accident of Socrates that is not part of his essence, 
it is necessary because it “flows from” Socrates’ essence (Oderberg 2011:104). 
Charlotte Witt says, “An entity can have necessary properties that are not part of its 
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essence” (1989a:107).6 A necessary accident is what Aristotle calls a “proprium” in 
Topics: 
It is a proprium of man to be capable of learning grammar; for if a certain 
being is a man, he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of 
learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a proprium which 
can possibly belong to something else; for example, he does not say that sleep 
is a proprium of man. (102
a
20-25)  
Fran O’Rourke asks “whether a series of ‘accidental changes’ can amount to a change 
in the specific nature of the offspring” (2004: 27). B.A. Brody says “when a sufficient 
number of the right properties have changed, one says that there is now a new 
object … not a new state of the old object” (1967: 435) Notice, however, that we 
should not ask how changes in necessary accidents may generate a change in essence, 
if necessary accidents “flow from” the essence. Since species evolution involves 
substantial changes, our leading question concerns only how successive changes in 
non-necessary accidents can generate a substantial change in species, i.e., a change in 
the essence of species. 
 
C. Aristotelian Essentialism 
1. Property Essentialism 
Despite Aristotle’s straightforward claim that “the essence of each thing is what it is 
said to be in virtue of itself” (Met.1029b10-1029b16; 1017b23; 1043a22; 1029b22; 
                                                          
6
 A non-necessary accident may nevertheless become necessary as the level of generality varies 
(Peramatzis 2011:198). “Having long legs” or “webbed feet” are not necessary accidents of a bird, but 
are necessary accidents of a crane (Lennox 2001: 174). 
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1030
b
5; Top. 101
b
38-102
a
1), clarification of this concept has been difficult. The 
prevailing view is “property essentialism” (Oderberg 2011:87) according to which an 
essence is an essential property. Alexander Bird defines essences of individuals as 
“properties that those individuals possess essentially” (2009:1). Essential properties 
are a set of necessary accidents “more closely tied” to what it is to be a thing (Cohen 
1978a:395; Oderberg 2011:89).  
Jeremy Pierce has observed that property essentialists face a “vagueness 
problem” (2011:10-15). There is no clear standard to privilege a set of necessary 
accidents as essential (Oderberg 2011). We do not know whether an IQ of 68, 69 or 
70 is essential to being human (Hill 2007:22). More seriously, property essentialists 
conflate necessary accidents and the cause of necessary accidents (Witt 1989b:288). 
Aristotle takes essences as causally and explanatorily basic (Apo B.2 90
a
14-15; B.8 
93
a
3-4).
7
 But an essence cannot be both a set of necessary properties and their cause 
(Oderberg 2011:94). As a set of necessary accidents, essential properties cannot be 
causally responsible for themselves (Witt 1989a:106; 108). Property essentialists 
commit a category mistake (Durrant 1975:596) by overturning the explanatory 
priority of essence (Witt 1989b:298).  
But what is an essential property if not an essence? Recall that Brody defines 
“essential property” as follows: “an object o1 has a property P1 essentially just in case 
o1 has P1 and would go out of existence if it lost it: just in case the loss of it would 
involve a substantial change.” In contrast, “an object o1 has a property P1 accidentally 
                                                          
7
 A detailed account of the causal link is admittedly absent from Aristotle’s works (Charles 2000:339). 
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just in case o1 has P1 but could lose it without going out of existence: just in case the 
loss of it would involve a mere alteration” (1973:354). 
Yet it seems to me that an essential property so defined is, according to 
Aristotle, just a necessary accident. “If [the property essentialist] wishes, she can … 
maintain her devotion to contemporary usage by calling every feature of a thing a 
property of it,” Oderberg says, “not much is to be achieved … except obfuscation … 
The essence of a thing is distinct from its properties” (2011:98). It was traditionally 
held that thunder has the essential property of “fire-quenching” which is causally 
responsible for thunder’s being noisy, being accompanied by lightning, etc (Charles 
2000:202). But Michail Peramatzis contends that “fire-quenching” is just part of the 
essence of thunder (2011:187). I hold likewise that “being rational” is not an essential 
property of humans, but part of the essence of humans. 
 
2. Form and Matter 
Having questioned property essentialism, I now turn to a positive account of 
Aristotle’s essentialism. For Aristotle, each living individual is a hylomorphic 
compound. Essence is what it is to be a thing formally––substance without signate 
matter (Met. 1032
b
11-14). As such it is a principle of life that organizes the 
constitutive matter into a living thing (Yu 2001). The essence of a species is the 
principle of life for all the members of that species. 
Species members are one in form. “For Aristotle, to speak of ‘one form’ or 
‘the same form’ is to speak of a respect in which many matter/form composites are 
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indistinguishable” (Lennox 2001:153). Socrates and Callias are one in the human 
form despite the differences “in virtue of their matter” (Met. 1034a5-1034a9). Species 
members are one in form to emulate immortality (GA II.1 731
b
31–5; Peramatzis 
2011:196; Hankinson 2009:219). “That which comes into being is eternal in the way 
that is possible for it,” says Aristotle, “now it is not possible in number ... but it is 
possible in form. That is why there is always a kind––of men and of animals and of 
plants” (GA II.1 731b33-732a1). Lennox adds, “an individual organism is eternal in 
form if it is the product of, and in turn has a natural disposition to produce an 
individual, the general essence-revealing account of which is identical with its own” 
(2001:146).  
But a species-form cannot merely be a principle of life; otherwise one species-
form is not different from another (Oderberg 2011:95; Shields 2007:292). Species-
forms render matter of organisms determinate differently (Met. 1029
a
9-30). There is 
no pure matter in the biological world. Matter stripped of any form is, according to 
Aristotle, not matter except homonymously: “the soul … is the essence of such and 
such a body … [I]f an eye were an animal, its soul would be sight … The eye is the 
matter of sight; if sight is lost, it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, in the 
way that a stone eye or painted eye is” (DA 412b10–21).  
Aristotelian essences as forms are ontologically dependent on matter. Even if 
a form of statue can persist without a particular lump of bronze or even without 
bronze in general, it will disappear if all constitutive matter of statues disappears. As 
Peramatzis observes,  
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[A] form cannot be defined without mentioning a range of certain matter: e.g. 
being made of bulky, malleable, solidifiable, and wrought-able materials, the 
types of material feature appropriate to characterize essentially the relevant 
statue-form.(2011:173; my italic) 
Aristotelian essences as forms are also biologically dependent on matter. 
Biologists no longer assume that the information in genes stand to organisms as form 
stands to matter (Goyette 2002; Pearcey 1996; Kass 1994; Stewart and Cohen 1994).
8
  
The information in genes is not a “blueprint” that dictates changes in phenotypic 
properties. Biologists have proposed instead that “changes in gene frequencies within 
a population are … the causal consequence of changes in individual phenotype” 
(Walsh 2006: 440). As Denis Walsh calls attention to “genetic accommodation,”  
For any novel phenotype, there may be within the population many alternative 
gene-regulatory networks, or systems of modules, capable of producing it; 
some will be more efficient than others, some will be more robust. Phenotypic 
accommodation exposes the latent genetic variation within the population. 
This variation is then subject to selection (2006:439).   
Further, the matter of organisms can preserve the form of a species by providing 
subsidiary parts whose natural function is to increase the wellbeing of species 
                                                          
8
 West-Eberhard has proposed that “plasticity is the ability of an organism to react to an internal or 
external environmental input with a change in form, state, movement, or rate of activity” (2003:33). 
Yet one could argue that such plasticity belongs to matter instead of form. After all, Aristotle is 
cautious about attributing configuration or shape to form, “a dead body has exactly the same 
configuration as a living one; but for all that it is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or wood or 
constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name. For… it will be 
unable to perform its function. (PA i.1 640b35- 641a4) 
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(Leunissen 2010:130). Given the ontological and biological dependence of form upon 
matter, I shall formulate Aristotle’s essentialism but in terms of both matter and form. 
 
3. Potentiality and Actuality 
What is matter and what is form? I draw on Vasilis Politis’ “process-based” 
understanding of the Aristotelian matter. To be matter is not simply to be material, 
but to be material “in the process of the generation of things” (Politis 2004:58; GA 
II.1 733
b
32-734
a
6). Specifically, matter is in a process to take on a substantial form 
(Phys. 194
b
32-5; 193
b
13-18). The matter of Socrates is not merely the flesh and bones 
of Socrates, but the flesh and bones that are becoming Socrates (Phys.192
b
34-194
a
1; 
a
3-7). Matter without form lacks the “dynamic structure which orients them by natural 
tendency” (O’Rourke 2004:24). Matter and form thus stand to each other as 
potentiality stands to actuality. “There must pre-exist something which potentially is,” 
Aristotle says, “but actually is not” (GC 317b15-317b17). For instance, bricks 
potentially are a house that is yet to come (Coope 2009:278). “In all possible 
contexts,” Peramatzis says, “potentiality for change is the only or the most prominent 
part of [Aristotle’s] conception of matter” (2011:146). Thus I define Aristotle’s 
essentialism as follows: 
Aristotelian Essentialism =defn. The essence of a species is the form or formal 
nature that actualizes the potentiality of the matter or material nature of 
individuals in that species. 
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For any individual organism, having the essence of a species entails having the matter 
with a certain potentiality, the actuality of which is the form of that species.
9
  
A substantial change happens when what potentially is becomes what actually 
is. Yet a change in the essence of species—a substantial change in species—has two 
stages: an individual that potentially is F first becomes what potentially is G, and then 
becomes what actually is G (Witt 1989a:130).
10
 A substantial change in species is not 
an event in which a new species with one actuality directly replaces an old species 
with another actuality. That a rabbit supersedes a pigeon is a magic trick that happens 
not in nature. Essentialism will be magic if essentialists claim that what actually is F 
can become what actually is G. But essentialism seems more plausible if essentialists 
need only say how what potentially is F can become what potentially is G. 
 
  
                                                          
9
 Aristotle distinguishes between “first actuality” (the process) and “second actuality” (the result). But 
this distinction need not concern us here. 
10
 Speciation can be allopatric, peripatric, parapatric, sympatric, artificial, or hybrid. Molecular 
phylogenetic studies indicate, for instance, that what potentially is a member of Pinicola may become 
what actually is a member of Pyrrhula. Both species belong to the clade of bullfinches. 
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Chapter Two: Stating the Proposal 
A. Multiple Potentialities 
I hereby offer the key—my multiple-potentiality strategy—to resolve the tension 
between Aristotelian essentialism and species evolution. The multiple-potentiality 
strategy aims to draw on the flexibility in the potentialities of matter. This is the crux 
of this strategy: Aristotelian matter has multiple potentialities such that what 
potentially is a member of species F can change into what potentially is a member of 
species G. This places much “responsibility” of resolving the tension on the 
significance of matter. Mariska Leunissen testifies,  
[T]he material nature of an animal has a much larger and more positive 
influence on the generation of animals and their parts than is usually attributed 
to it: the material nature does not merely constrain the realizations of parts 
necessary for the animal’s life or being, but also creates possibilities for the 
formal contribution to the animal’s wellbeing or even produces parts 
independently of the actions of the formal nature. (2010:131)  
To illustrate, let us consider an example of inanimate things first. A raw gold supplier 
wants some gold chalices and so gives some gold to an artisan. The artisan makes lots 
of gold chalices. Yet the artisan also makes some gold necklaces for self-amusement. 
We have some actual gold necklaces in the end. To become gold necklaces in 
actuality, the pieces of gold must once be gold necklaces in potentiality. Each piece of 
gold was also a gold chalice in potentiality, since the artisan can choose to turn each 
piece of gold into a gold chalice as intended by the supplier. Thus it is evident that all 
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pieces of gold in the artisan’s hands have two potentialities only one of which is 
actualized. In some cases, a change in the artisan’s goal initiates a change in the 
potentiality of gold. Thus what potentially are gold chalices become what potentially 
are gold necklaces, which further become what actually are gold necklaces. 
Suppose the raw material supplier later discovers that the artisan has made 
some gold necklaces other than gold chalices. The supplier asks, “Is it out of my gold 
that you made these gold necklaces?” The artisan says Yes. The supplier wonders, 
“But my gold is supposed to be turned into gold chalices!” The artisan says, 
“Sometimes I make gold necklaces to amuse myself. And I used your gold.” 
The supplier is surprised to see an unexpected potentiality of his gold realized. 
It does not matter whether there is one gold necklace or ten necklaces. All it takes for 
the supplier to be surprised is one gold necklace, because one is enough to show the 
presence of an unexpected actuality of his gold. 
Now consider a slightly different case. A raw gold supplier goes to an artisan 
with some gold and says, “Please make some gold chalices. And if some gold is unfit 
for chalices, make some gold necklaces out of them. If some gold is not even fit for 
gold necklaces, use them to make some gold leaves that can be used to adorn sushi. 
I’ll leave it to your judgment which piece of gold is fit for what outcome.” The artisan 
ends up making some gold chalices, some gold necklaces and some gold leaves to 
adorn sushi. 
The new feature in this case is that the supplier already knows all three 
potentialities his gold has: gold chalice, gold necklace, and gold leaf. Since the 
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supplier leaves the judgment to the artisan regarding which piece of gold is suitable 
for what outcomes, the supplier does not have control over what potentialities will get 
realized. Nevertheless the supplier will not be surprised this time if in the end he sees 
some gold necklaces or gold leaves. It is worth noting, further, that the supplier will 
have this confidence: the gold chalices will be the artisan’s first priority in 
considering what to turn a piece of gold into, the gold necklaces the second priority 
and the gold leaves the third priority. 
Now consider the fundamental particles that make up the matter of living 
things. Such fundamental particles are physical and subatomic.  These subatomic 
particles can change with respect to how they are arranged in space. Some but not all 
changes in the arrangement of subatomic particles will result in changes in the 
arrangements of atoms. If the atoms in question are those that make up genes, genetic 
changes will occur. Still, not all genetic changes will affect the potentiality of matter. 
Indeed, even in those cases where some genetic changes result in a change in the 
potentiality, it is admittedly far from clear to us what the intermediate links are. But 
in the present inquiry we do not have so much an epistemological responsibility of 
specifying how genetic changes can result in changes in potentiality, as we just have 
to make the metaphysical recognition that genetic changes sometimes give rise to new 
species. That biological fact alone suffices to show that genetic changes sometimes 
result in changes in the potentiality of matter, for without a change in potentiality in 
the first place, no change in actuality can ever obtain. Thus some genetic changes will 
cause changes in the potentialities of the constitutive matter of living things. 
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Accordingly, the constitutive matter will realize a different actuality other than the 
actuality which would have been realized had there not been a change in the 
potentiality. Given Aristotelian essentialism, once a different actuality is realized, a 
new essence is realized. To say it in a more “historically correct” way, once a 
different potentiality is being developed, it is already a new essence or form that is 
guiding the biological growth. Notice that our account is different from a rabbit-
pigeon magic, because our explanatory chain starts from a change in the 
undetermined potentiality from an old one to a new one, and ends with a determined 
actuality which is the natural culmination of the new potentiality. In the rabbit-pigeon 
magic, what the magician does, at least in the audience’s eyes, is to starts with an 
already determined actuality and, without any natural course of development, 
immediately ends with a new determined actuality. 
A one-one correspondence certainly exists between one potentiality of the 
constitutive matter and one actuality of the constitutive matter. Nonetheless, we must 
keep in mind that no such one-one correspondence exists either between one way 
fundamental particles of the constitutive matter of organisms are arranged and one 
way genes can be, or between one way genes can be and one potentiality of the 
constitutive matter. This is why I used the word “some” twice in the preceding 
paragraph. The number of ways in which fundamental particles can be arranged 
exceeds the number of the ways genes can be, which in turn exceeds the number of 
all potentialities of the constitutive matter. It is very likely that all three numbers are 
infinite. But for the multiple-potentiality strategy to work, it does not have to be so. 
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The multiple-potentiality strategy still works even if some or all of the three numbers 
are finite. It is important simply to keep in mind that although a slight change in 
number, size or shape of fundamental particles will, strictly speaking, changes the 
way fundamental particles are arranged, such change need not (though it may) cause a 
change in the way genes are. Likewise, many different ways genes are can yield the 
same potentiality of matter. After all, not all genes have an impact on species essence, 
not to mention that genes that do have an impact on species essence may fail to be 
manifested. 
 
B. The Dissolution of the Leading Question  
At the end of the first section of Part I, I posed the leading question for our inquiry. I 
asked, “How can successive changes in traits of species members generate a change 
in the essence of a species?” Now seems a good time to answer this question. 
 According to my multiple-potentiality strategy, the reason why a change in 
the essence of a species happens is ultimately not to be found in observable 
successive changes in the traits of species, because it is changes in arrangements of 
fundamental particles rather than observable accidental changes that are the ultimate 
driving force why species evolve. Nonetheless biologists often use observable 
successive accidental changes at the phenomenal level as a guide to tell whether a 
new species has evolved. Biologists, of course, cannot be always wrong. 
To relax the tension, notice first that it is perfectly possible for changes in 
fundamental particles to generate accidental changes on the phenomenally observable 
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level. In that case what goes on at the fundamental level and what goes on at the 
phenomenal level will not come apart. To be sure, the reverse is always true: 
accidental changes cannot happen without there being some changes in the 
arrangement of fundamental particles. Accidental changes which biologists find as 
relevant to decide whether species essences have changed are sometimes a useful 
guide, but they are just not the ultimate criterion of whether species evolution has 
happened. This is so because arrangements of fundamental particles can change 
without the biological matter manifesting phenomenal accidental changes at all or 
without manifesting them in an easily observable manner. 
Suppose there is a change in the arrangement of certain fundamental particles 
which result in genetic changes that alters the potentiality of the constitutive matter of 
some organism. But imagine that no observable accidental changes occur. In this case 
there is a change in essence of species, which makes species evolve. But biologists 
cannot discover this, because there is no phenomenal evidence. This is one possible 
source of conflict between a biologist and an essentialist. 
Suppose that some observable accidental changes occur as a result of some 
changes in the arrangement of fundamental particles. But imagine that no genetic 
changes occur, which makes it impossible for changes in potentialities of the 
constitutive matter to take place. In this case biologists observe something that should 
not be taken as decisive evidence for species evolution. Genetic studies should 
accommodate studies of physiological and anatomical features. 
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Now I want to draw attention to a hard case in which my answer to the leading 
question seems to have unfavorable bearings on biological practice.  
(HARD CASE) Imagine this combination of changes. Changes in the 
arrangements of fundamental particles first happen. Next changes in genes 
happen. Then easily observable accidental changes happen. But the 
potentiality of the constitutive matter remains unchanged. 
What would biologists say when they encounter this combination of changes? It 
seems that they can say, “Farewell to Aristotelian essentialism! This species surely 
evolved. Look! We have new genes and new traits.” But the “Aristotelian fact” is that 
species evolution has not occurred in the hard case, since no change in potentiality 
means no change in essence. Here lies the really serious conflict between Aristotelian 
essentialism and contemporary biologists’ conception of what species evolution is. 
Unless I can find a way to settle this conflict, the compatibility advanced in this paper 
will undoubtedly fail. 
 There seems to be two possible approaches towards reconciliation. One might 
be called “compromised essentialism and uncompromised evolution,” and the other 
“uncompromised essentialism and compromised evolution.” Let us examine them in 
turn. 
 
1. Compromised Essentialism and Uncompromised Evolution 
If Aristotelian essentialists are willing, in the hard case, to compromise their position, 
what will the modified essentialism look like? Essentialists should concede that 
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species really evolved. Accordingly, there must have been a change in essence, which 
makes a change in potentiality necessary. But the hard case is set up such that there is 
no change in potentialities of the constitutive matter. The essentialists must explain 
how it is possible for essences to change without there being any change in 
potentialities of the constitutive matter. This is logically impossible on Aristotelian 
grounds. So the first approach is down. 
 
2. Uncompromised Essentialism and Compromised Evolution 
 If biologists compromise their position, what will the modified conception of 
evolution look like? Biologists should concede that the species really has not evolved, 
despite all the scientific evidence pointing to the contrary. Is there any motivation for 
biologists to concede this point? There does not seem to be any. But since biologists’ 
compromise involves no logical contradiction, here lies our hope for reconciliation. 
 To achieve the compatibility thesis, the biological side has to yield. In the 
hard case while the observed evidence tells biologists that a species has evolved, the 
species remains the same. Biologists may protest that unless essentialists have equally 
good evidence for their position, biologists ought not to yield. Although this may 
sound like a reasonable demand in its own right, it is not the job of an Aristotelian 
essentialist to point to biological evidence in order to justify essentialism. Aristotelian 
essentialism, as a metaphysical position, is never meant to threaten contemporary 
biological theory and practice. If biologists did not come with anti-essentialist 
metaphysical commitment, biologists would not insist that the phenomenal 
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appearance of evolution must overturn essentialism. Both essentialism and anti-
essentialism, as metaphysical frameworks, can organize the scientific data found by 
biologists. After all, it is a metaphysical dispute as to when a hard case happens and 
how its occurrence can be discerned. For biologists, it is nothing unscientific to 
remain metaphysically neutral: should such an experimentally opaque hard case ever 
occurs, just make some room for essentialists so that they can pursue their 
metaphysical project. Hard cases are never meant to be biologists’ headaches. Our 
leading question, or rather our leading confusion, gets dissolved at this point. I shall 
now turn to some positive construction. 
  
C. The Combatility Argument 
If there is a change in the matter from developing one potentiality to developing 
another potentiality, there will accordingly be a change from realizing one actuality to 
realizing another actuality. Then a change in essence will result. This is how species 
evolution is intelligible on Aristotelian grounds. In other words, Aristotelian 
essentialism is capable of describing what is going on with species evolution in its 
own terms. The central argument in this paper––my argument for the compatibility 
thesis––can therefore be formulated as follows: 
(COM-P1) Aristotelian essentialism can describe what is going on with 
species evolution. 
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(COM-P2) If Aristotelian essentialism can describe what is going on with 
species evolution, Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with species 
evolution. 
Therefore, (COM-C) Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with species 
evolution. 
Broadly speaking, what I have said from the beginning of this paper is an attempt to 
establish the plausibility of P1. That is, the whole process of “situating the puzzle” in 
Chapter One can be seen as part of my attempt to describe what is going on with 
species evolution. My multiple-potentiality strategy and my answer to the leading 
question in Chapter Two “Stating the Proposal,” in particular, are aimed at bringing 
out a lesson about how the potentialities of matter can change and result in a change 
in species essence. This is also to describe, in Aristotelian terms, what is going on 
with evolution. But to firmly establish P1, let me say a few more words.  
Whenever species evolve, it is thought that some new essence is realized. So 
whenever species evolve, there had been a change in the potentiality possessed by the 
constitutive matter as a result of a change in the way the fundamental particles were 
arranged.  
 But here is a worry. I claim that whenever species evolve there had been a 
change in the potentialities of matter. This claim seems to entail something odd: all 
the potentialities for every present species must already exist before anything evolved 
at all. To see how, recall that every present species has an essence that is the actuality 
of a potentiality. Now, if the variety of potentialities merely depends on the 
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arrangement of fundamental particles, we should accept that the matter of any living 
thing––which once existed, now exists, and will exist––must contain every possible 
potentiality. Presumably the fundamental particles of any living thing can be arranged 
in any way. Thus every possible potentiality is contained in the matter of any living 
thing. But then any living thing would have innumerous alternative potentialities to 
develop. Indeed, every potentiality for every essence that has existed and every 
essence that has existed are live options for just any organism. The biological 
boundary between species essences seems too conveniently crossable. Would 
evolution not be chaotic if descendent species can evolve back into ancestral species, 
or if species can easily take on the essence of something that belongs to a totally 
different genera? But according to the description I offered, there is nothing to stop 
evolution from being that chaotic. As long as the fundamental particles of a human 
fetus rearrange properly, the fetus will grow into a zebra. 
 I admit that on the multiple-potentiality strategy I develop, it must be possible 
for the matter of fish to have the potentiality to become a pigeon, or the matter of 
human to have the potentiality to become a zebra. To the opponent’s credit, I would 
now make some qualifications about the language of “new” or “old” essences. 
Strictly speaking, every species essence, which has existed in history, already existed 
in potentiality of the matter of the first living thing at the beginning of evolution. 
There are, strictly speaking, neither “new” nor “old” essences or species forms. The 
language that old species evolved into new species is acceptable only in the following 
sense: this has been how evolution manifolds itself in a temporal order. There are 
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earlier comers and later comers into the natural world, and biologists call those earlier 
comers “old” species and later comers “new.” But strictly speaking, both 
potentialities and actualities of the later comers are every bit as “old” as those of the 
earlier comers. 
Having said so, I maintain that the multiple potentiality view will not mess up 
the order of evolution. To see why, let us draw a distinction between “proximate 
potentiality” and “remote potentiality.” To introduce this distinction, consider the 
following scenario. 
 Suppose a group of passengers are boarding the flight AA1166 from Saint 
Louis to New York City. As scheduled by the airline company, the flight lasts 2 hours. 
Suppose we ask one passenger before boarding the place, “Do you think the plane 
potentially is to arrive at New York?” This passenger answers, “Why not? I paid $170 
for the ticket! It had better arrive in New York, or I will miss my meeting and sue the 
airline.” When we press for a direct answer, he says, “Unless there is something like a 
terrorist attack, the plane is not only potential to land on New York but will most 
likely land there in 2 hours.” The confidence with which our interviewed passenger 
responds shows that there is a sense in which the plane is not merely potentially 
arriving in New York, but “very much” potentially arriving in New York. Notice, 
however, that there is a sense in which Flight AA1166 has the potential to land on 
Washington, or Los Angeles, or Paris, or Cairo, or probably anywhere on earth, 
provided that it has sufficient jet fuel and electricity.  
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 Now, the sense of potentiality in which the plane is potentially landing in New 
York is “proximate” potentiality. In our case, it is proximate because of the schedule 
of the airline company. If nothing abnormal such as a terrorist attack happens, the 
plane will take its scheduled course and realize this potentiality. In contrast, the sense 
of potentiality in which the plane is potentially landing in anywhere on earth is 
“remote” potentiality. In our case, a remote potentiality of the plane’s destination is 
more like a bare possibility that the plane has and is fairly unlikely to obtain if things 
go normally. 
 To explicate this distinction further, let us imagine a terrorist attack does 
happen and the plane is forced to land in Bermuda in the Atlantic Ocean. Suppose 
Bermuda is home to the terrorists hijacking the plane. They have other bases in 
Hawaii and Honolulu. Imagine the passenger we happen to ask is one of those 
terrorists. So we ask him, “Do you think the plane is potentially landing in New 
York?” Suppose that this terrorist passenger is well aware of the distinction between 
proximate potentiality and remote potentiality. He honestly answers, “So far as I can 
tell, this flight is proximately potential to land on New York. That is what almost 
everybody believes. But in fact, the plane is remotely potential to land on Hawaii, 
Honolulu and Bermuda. For this flight, I believe Bermuda is a potentiality less remote 
than Hawaii and Honolulu.” 
 The reply shows that even among those remote potentialities there can be a 
hierarchical order of remoteness, given certain contexts and circumstances. From the 
eyes of the terrorists, although Bermuda is not the proximate potentiality of the plane, 
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it is not a potentiality as remote as Hawaii (certainly not as remote as Paris) either. 
Bermuda is a potential landing place whose remoteness is second to New York City 
and prior to other places. 
 With the distinction between proximate potentiality and remote potentiality 
spotlighted and stratified, let us come to the biological world. I hold that the 
constitutive matter of a living thing has multiple potentialities one of which is 
proximate. What counts as proximate in the biological world certainly depends on 
environmental constraints such as geographical location, climate, water, sunshine, 
presence of predators and preys, etc. But among all the environmental constraints the 
most decisive and most direct is the species form of an organism’s ancestors. If your 
biological parents are members of the human species, your constitutive matter will 
have a proximate potentiality to become a human. In ordinary language, if your 
parents are human, you have human genetic makeup.  
In the biological world, all non-proximate potentialities are likewise remote 
potentialities with different degrees of remoteness. The potentiality for the matter of a 
Puli dog has a remote potentiality to become a Pumi dog and a remote potentiality to 
become a Pyrenean Shepherd. But the potentiality to become a Pumi is a less remote 
one, since both Puli and Pumi originate from Hungary, yet Pyrenean Shepherd 
originates from France. The geographical difference between Hungary and France 
generally accounts for this order of remoteness of potentialities for a Puli dog. Still, 
the potentiality for the matter of a Puli dog to evolve into a whale is astronomically 
remote yet real.  
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In short, environmental constraints––most notably the essence of ancestors––
have an impact on the arrangement of fundamental particles of a living thing. The 
possession of proximate potentiality ensures that the multiple-potentiality strategy 
does not mess up the order of evolution. 
 There is one additional note to make. Species evolution, as made intelligible 
on Aristotelian grounds, starts and ends with an individual. It is a change in the 
potentiality of the constitutive matter of an individual living thing that causes a 
substantial change to take place. So there must have been numerous unnoticed species 
evolution. Indeed, it can take long and laborious work for biologists to recognize that 
species evolution has actually occurred. It can take as long as several genetic drifts 
for biologists to recognize the presence of new species. Yet according to Aristotelian 
essentialism, a new species comes into being as soon as an individual living thing 
with a new essence comes into being. Thus new essences occur more frequently than 
new biologically recognized species occur. Enough has been said to show that the 
first premise in my compatibility argument is true or at least very probable. 
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Chapter Three: Striking the Persecutors 
What about COM-P2? To recall, P2 says that if Aristotelian essentialism can describe 
what is going on with species evolution, Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with 
species evolution. More generally, we can abstract the following epistemic principle 
out of P2:  
(PRINCIPLE) If a system of thinking, S, can explain some event or process L, 
then S is compatible with L.  
To establish P2, we need to establish this epistemic principle. Notice that it is not 
enough for S to merely describe L. S must be able to explain L in a cogent and 
coherent manner. To illustrate, Euclidean geometry can describe a round square. A 
round square is the set of all points in a plane that not only have a certain distance 
from a certain point, but also form four equal sides and four equal angles. But a round 
square is a self-contradictory concept and in reality there is no such thing as a round 
square. Euclidean geometry cannot be compatible with something self-contradictory. 
Hence Euclidean geometry is not compatible with a round square. Even if Euclidean 
geometry can describe a round square, the former cannot explain a round square, 
because a round square is nonsensical. 
 We have some prima facie reason to think the epistemic principle is true. If a 
system of thinking, S, can explain L, it shows that we make sense of L on the grounds 
of S. In other words, S-theorists can make sense of L. Now if L were indeed 
incompatible with S, S-theorists would not have made sense of something that is 
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incompatible with S. This is so because S would imply something that is in conflict 
with L. 
 Here is an objection. It seems that Christian theologians have a theory that can 
describe what is going on with sexual immorality. According to our epistemic 
principle, this shows that Christian theology is compatible with sexual immorality, 
which sounds odd. Maybe worse still, theism can describe what is going on with 
atheism. But it surely does not follow that theism is compatible with atheism. One 
cannot be both a theist and be an atheist. So the principle must be flawed. 
 This puzzle points to a general problem luring in the principle. I concede that 
there is indeed a sense in which theism is compatible with both sexual immorality and 
atheism. Just consider Psalm 139:12 according to which darkness and light are the 
same to God. It does not follow that God would encourage or embrace darkness. So 
there is a sense in which sexual immorality and the sexual morality are the same to 
the theist, which would both make sexual immorality compatible with theism and 
allow the theists to embrace and encourage only sexual morality. Likewise, there is a 
sense in which theism and atheism are the same to the (meta!)theists (i.e., one 
interested in God in general), which would both make atheism compatible with 
(meta!)theism and allow the (meta!)theists to embrace and encourage only theism. 
The word of “metatheism” is used in order that it is not confused with the theism 
which stands in contrast with atheism. 
 Could it then be the case that Aristotelian essentialism is a “meta-theory” that 
is compatible with species evolution without embracing or encouraging species 
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evolution? That is, Aristotelian essentialism may be compatible with species 
evolution in the same way as God is compatible with darkness, or if you will, Satan 
with light. Maybe Aristotelian essentialism is just compatible with species evolution, 
but ultimately unfriendly towards species evolution. Maybe I have not shown 
anything other than a compatibility thesis in which the notion of compatibility is as 
thin as the compatibility in the sentence “a source of light is compatible with darkness” 
or “a theory of rightness is compatible with wrongness” in the meta-eyes of some 
meta-theorists. In short, there are two senses of compatibility: 
STRONG COMPATIBLITY =defn. A is strongly compatible with B just in 
case A is compatible with B and A encourages, embraces or is friendly towards 
B. 
WEAK COMPATIBLITY =defn. A is weakly compatible with B just in case 
A is compatible with B and A fails to encourage, embrace or be friendly 
towards B. 
The question left for us is to examine whether the compatibility in the second premise 
is strong or weak. To appeal to the epistemic principle at this stage is no longer 
adequate, because the principle itself is open to two interpretations according to these 
two senses of compatibility. If Aristotelian essentialism is merely weakly compatible 
with species evolution, the second premise will be trivially true, which will make my 
compatibility argument no longer philosophically interesting albeit valid. 
Here is how I am going to find it out. I will consider arguments from 
evolutionary theorists against Aristotelian essentialism. If there is anywhere to find 
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unfriendliness, this is where to find it. If any of their arguments succeed, it shows that 
Aristotelian essentialism by virtue of describing what is going on with species 
evolution might still be weakly compatible with species evolution. Then we would 
concede that the second premise is trivially true. But if none of the major arguments 
against Aristotelian essentialism succeeds, we will have a strong confidence that the 
second premise is true on the strong sense of compatibility. This confidence will be 
justified by the disappearance of all major unfriendliness. 
Since we have defined Aristotelian essentialism in terms of potentiality and 
actuality, our conception of Aristotelian essence is teleological. The arguments we 
will examine are generally held to be not just against Aristotelian essentialism in 
general but against Aristotelian natural teleology in particular, which makes a 
confrontation with these argument even more desirable to me. 
 
A. The Arguments from Non-Actuality 
The argument from non-actuality is motivated by the following concern. The causal 
order in nature goes from things in the past to things at present and from things at 
present to things in the future. No backward causation is allowed in nature. According 
to Aristotelian essentialism, essences guide or determine the development of 
organisms.
11
 If this were so, essences would play an explanatory role in the 
development of organisms. But if essences are the actualities which are the ends of 
the biological development, essences must exist after each stage of the biological 
                                                          
11
 Unless otherwise specified, I will use “guide” and “determine” interchangeably. 
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development. Hence essences cannot explain anything in the biological development 
that exists before essences are realized. The argument from non-actuality can be thus 
formulated: 
(NAT-P1) The explanans precedes its explanandum in a causal explanation.  
(NAT-P2) If means precedes ends, ends cannot be the explanans.  
(NAT-P3) Means precedes ends. 
(NAT-C1) Ends cannot be the explanans. 
(NAT-P4) If ends cannot be the explanans, teleology is mistaken. 
Therefore, (NAT-C) teleology is mistaken. 
P1 seems true because causation happens in time. In a causal explanation, what 
already occurs or exists explains what is yet to occur or exist (Walsh 2008:116). If 
something has not yet occurred, its lack of reality makes it explanatorily impotent. If 
what is not yet existing explains what already exists, the causation is backward and 
reverses the temporal order of our world. P4 seems true because Aristotelian 
essentialism by virtue of its teleological nature appears to affirm a backward 
causation which can never happen. In a teleological explanation, the end state or telos 
has not yet existed. But an unactualized goal cannot explain anything. Teleology is 
mistaken because its order of explanation violates P1.  
 P3 seems trivially true. If I am on my way driving to the store, the movement 
of my car can explain my presence at the store in the future. My presence at the store 
in the future cannot backwardly explain the movement of my car. 
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 One might try to reject P3 by saying that although ends cannot explain, mental 
representations of ends can explain (Walsh 2008:116-117). My presence at the store, 
as an unactualized goal, cannot explain the movement of my car. But my mental 
representation of my presence at the store, which is something happening right now, 
can explain the movement of my car. My representation motivates my body to drive 
the car to the store.  
Three considerations render this objection unfavorable. First, Aristotelian 
natural teleology is not artificial teleology. No mental representation is necessarily 
involved in Aristotelian natural teleology. For Aristotle, the end, actuality, essence or 
formal nature of biological development is part of nature which contains a principle 
for motion and rest. Natural end is not the result of living things’ mental activities or 
psychological states (Physics II 8, 199
b
26-30; Henry 2012:39). A sheep need not 
mentally represent the essence of sheep at any moment in its life in order to be sheep 
at all. Living things are essentially what they are whether or not they mentally 
represent their essences. 
Second, the objection runs into conflict with evolutionary thinking. In the 
“opportunistic” process of natural selection, nowhere shall we find essences of 
organisms predetermined by the mental representations of organisms (Ayala 2008:72-
73). Biological organisms that are better adapted to their environments are simply 
preserved by nature. The evolved new species better fit with the environment. The 
very idea that essences are determined by means—whatever means it is—should be 
excluded from evolutionary thinking. 
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Third, the objection only reinforces P3 even if it succeeds. My mental 
representation of my presence at the grocery store exists before or (though a bit more 
controversially) simultaneously with the movement of my car. This will make my 
mental representation a means towards the movement of my car, which in effect 
makes my mental representation a means towards another means. As long as the 
objection works under the assumption about the temporal order of explanation, all it 
does, if anything, is to bolster P3. 
P2 follows from P1. C1 follows from P2 and P3 by modus ponens. P1, P3 and 
P4 seem all true. The argument from non-actuality seems to go through.  
Upon further reflection this argument suffers from ambiguity of reference. To 
what do the words “means” and “ends” refer? It is intuitively appealing to assume 
that the word “means” refer to whatever biological mechanisms through which the 
mature organism develops, and that the word “ends” refer to the forms, essences or 
goals. Notice that this argument would count against Aristotelian natural teleology 
only if we read the argument with this intuitively appealing assumption. 
But this assumption is questionable. From an Aristotelian point of view, there 
is a sense in which the essences can be the “means” and the biological mechanisms 
can be the “ends.” Since essences guide the biological development from beginning 
to end, it is not improbable to think that which and how mechanisms are used depends 
on essences. It is thus appropriate to think of essences as the means by which the 
biological mechanisms exist as ends. 
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But if mechanisms are ends, can we ever derive the mature organisms out of 
the mechanisms? Since the mechanisms are already the ends, it seems that the 
biological process cannot move on to its culmination. A human would constantly be 
in the process of becoming a human without ever being one. 
This worry, however, stems from a conflation between the hylomorphic 
compound mature organisms and the essences or forms of mature organisms. The 
essences of mature organisms are the formal nature of mature organisms which are 
hylomorphic compounds.  It may well be that essences are the means by which the 
biological mechanisms of development come into being as ends, and that the 
biological mechanisms of development are in turn the means by which the mature 
hylomorphic compound organisms come into being as ends. It is an illusion to think 
of essences as both the means and the ends of biological mechanisms. 
Now that I have proposed the possibility that essences can be the means, I 
want to say why, on Aristotelian grounds, this is indeed the case. According to 
Aristotelian essentialism, essences of living things are the formal natures of living 
things. Essences of living things contain the principle of motion and rest for those 
living things. Living things, by virtue of having essences, can initiate motion in a 
direction that culminates in a mature being. Essences are responsible for the 
biological mechanisms by determining what mechanisms can be used and where used 
mechanisms are going. In this respect essences stand to mechanism just as means 
stand to ends, because means are responsible for ends by determining what ends are 
realized and how ends are realized. 
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The argument from non-actuality fails because P4 is false. P4 says, “If ends 
cannot be the explanans, teleology is mistaken.” Now let us translate P4 in light of 
our foregoing discussion. So let “ends” refer to biological mechanisms. P4 becomes 
P4*, which reads 
(NAT-P4*) If biological mechanisms cannot be the explanans, teleology is 
mistaken.  
P4* is clearly false. This conditional simply does not obtain, because teleologists or 
Aristotelian essentialists have never been interested in making biological mechanisms 
the explanans. According to Aristotelian essentialism, it is the essence that is the 
explanans whose explanandum is the biological mechanism. If a proponent of the 
argument from non-actuality claims P4*, he just has no idea of what is at issue. If P4* 
is false, the argument from non-actuality is no longer good. 
 
B. The Argument from Randomness 
If essences guide or determine biological mechanisms, essences normatively require 
biological mechanisms. But the idea that evolution is normative seems hard to square 
with the view that evolution is random. It seems impossible to reserve one idea 
without unduly downplaying the significance of the other. This argument from 
randomness stems from this concern and can come in various versions. Now consider 
a simple version that immediately occurs to many people’s mind. 
 (RAM-P1) If the evolutionary process is random, there is no natural teleology. 
 (RAM-P2) Evolutionary process is random. 
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 Therefore, (RAM-C) there is no natural teleology. 
Is P1 true? If evolutionary process is random, no predictable purpose should belong to 
the process. The evolutionary process should lead to no pre-destined place. There is 
not a telos of the process.  
This brief reasoning is problematic, however, for two reasons. It is, strictly 
speaking, loose talk. There is nothing logically self-contradictory in saying that the 
evolutionary process attempts to follow and pursue the perfection and perpetuity of 
the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover while the evolutionary process fails this attempt by 
turning out random. 
More seriously, it works under the wrong assumption that Aristotelian natural 
teleology pertains to the entire evolutionary process. But Aristotelian natural 
teleology is primarily of individual beings in the evolutionary process rather than of 
the process itself. Even if the whole evolutionary process is random, it is perfectly 
possible that each individual in the process has a completely normative teleological 
development. Suppose George makes 100 gold chalices and Alison randomly selects 
30 out of the 100. The selecting process is as random as Alison wants. But the 
original 100 gold chalices are also as teleological as George wants. Since P1 is 
problematic, the simple version of the argument fails. 
 Now consider a refined version of the argument from randomness. 
(RRAM-P1) If the development of individual living things is unpredictable, 
there is no natural teleology, i.e., no normativity. 
(RRAM-P2) The development of individual living things is random. 
Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. 39 
 
Therefore, (RRAM-C) there is no natural teleology. 
Apparently P1 takes our challenge head-on. Whether the argument succeeds seems to 
hinge largely upon P2. Is P2 true? It seems true, at least to some extent according to 
evolutionary theory. Admittedly, the randomness invoked in this argument need never 
be so strong as to threaten the fact that certain biological outcomes occur “always or 
for the most part.” For Aristotle observes, “all natural things come to be as they do 
either always or usually, whereas no result of luck or chance comes to be as they do 
either always or usually” (Phys. II. 8 198b34-199a1). Still, there are at least two fairly 
uncontroversial senses in which the development of individual living things can be 
conceived as random. First, among the genes possessed by the parents, there is some 
randomness in exactly which genes get duplicated and disseminated to the offspring. 
Second, there is some randomness in genetic mutations. It is noteworthy that 
mutations are not dictated by which effects are good for the organisms (Nagel 
1979:300-301; Ayala 2008b:73). The two sources of randomness point to one fact: 
the offspring’s genes can differ from parents’ genes. P2 seems true. 
 But is P1, which apparently takes our challenge head-on, true? It is not clearly 
so at first sight. There are differences in genes that do not matter at all to whether the 
species evolve. For example, if the outcome of a genetic difference between a parent 
and an offspring is simply that the offspring will have a slightly longer nose, that 
genetic difference will, in normal circumstances, not yield a new species. This is so 
because, as we have seen, accidental changes do not count as a reason for substantial 
change. A slight difference in the size of nose is an accidental change. In normal 
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circumstances, it has no effect on whether the offspring is still of the same species. 
Further, we must also realize that genetic differences may have no manifestations 
whatsoever. Such a difference will not generate any substantial change either.  
 So let us get clear about what kind of genetic difference across generations 
really matters. What really matters are those genetic differences that are capable of 
producing a new species. If new species are able to evolve out of random genetic 
changes, it does seem that teleology for the individuals of the old species is sheer 
fantasy. But if old species do not have essences, we should not expect that new 
species have essences either. We should then admit that no teleology for individuals 
of whatever species (old or new) exists.  
 So far the argument remains forceful. But now I want to point out a 
questionable assumption behind P1: 
(ASSUMPTION) If something comes be through a random process, it has 
been unguided since the beginning of its existence.  
But this need not be true. Something that is guided can still turn out random. An 
individual can be guided by an essence, but something random happens such that that 
individual takes on a new essence. Genetic differences, results of which are new 
species, can randomly happen with essences of old species guiding the process. To 
illustrate, consider the following analogy. 
Suppose a Platonic philosopher-king, David, has a daughter, Diva. For the 
sake of illustration, let us say that David has the essence of philosopher-king. Now 
David wants Diva to be a philosopher-king (“philosopher-king” should be seen here 
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as an identity regardless of gender) in the future. So David raises Diva in every way 
he can control to put Diva on the track of a philosopher-king. For example, there are 
many pictures of philosopher-kings on the wall in Diva’s bedroom. When Diva eats, 
she is instructed to eat like a philosopher-king. Admittedly there is still randomness in 
the education process. For example, Diva can let her cat decide whether she gets the 
scrolls of Phaedo or Republic for her 15
th
 birthday gift. But overall the idea of being a 
philosopher-king in the future is guiding or supervising the growth of Diva. On the 
day of enthronement when Diva is 30 years old, everybody in town gathers to 
celebrate the event. Yet David is shocked to find Diva swearing to be a puppeteer. 
Diva testifies that ever since reading Republic she had loved that career. 
 Should we say then that Diva’s education is unguided? No. It is guided, to 
every detail, by the essence of philosopher-king with the expectation that she will one 
day become a philosopher-king herself. But something random happens such that 
Diva gets on the track of becoming a puppeteer and since become guided by the 
essence of puppeteer, though it takes very long for David to realize it! 
By analogy, an individual organism has a set of fundamental particles at birth. 
Though the elements of this set can change through time (as simply as by exhaling 
and inhaling), we are still sure that at birth, in order to be living at all, this set of 
fundamental particles must contain a potentiality that is leading towards and guided 
by an essence. As the organism is subject to environmental constraints in later stages 
of its development, it is subject to natural selection and hence the mechanistic power 
of evolution. At some point, as the result of random changes in the fundamental 
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particles, the constitutive matter consisting of fundamental particles undergoes a 
change in its potentiality, which then leads to a different actuality. The new actuality 
or essence becomes a new guidance for the development of the organism. There is 
nothing incoherent in this process. 
This shows, I think, that the assumption behind P1 is false. According to 
Aristotelian essentialism, it is possible for biological organisms guided by old 
essences to come through a random process to be guided by new essences. Hence P1 
is false. The argument from randomness does not work. 
 
C. The Argument from Functional Reducibility 
Let us now consider the argument from functional reducibility. Teleologists usually 
make their case by identifying some function of organisms and saying that functions 
testifies to the existence of telos. But it seems that for every explanation that specifies 
this teleological process, we can find a way to reduce it to a description of the process 
with the same content just by reversely focusing on the efficient causes. If there is no 
information loss in such reduction, teleological explanation is just one way to provide 
a causal explanation with a focus on the effects or consequences. 
 Consider Thomas Nagel’s example: fish have gills to breathe. Here we have a 
function, namely the gills, and organisms, namely fish, and effects or telos, namely 
breathing. A standard teleological explanation will look like this:  
The function (gills) is necessary for breathing.  
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In order to breathe, fish must have gills. Why are there gills? Gills are there to enable 
fish to breathe. But it seems that this explanation can be rewritten as this:  
Without gills, fish cannot breathe. Hence, fish must have gills.  
Nagel holds that the rewritten version neither makes nor implies teleology. Moreover, 
Nagel takes the following two explanations as equivalent in content (Ayala 1970:12): 
Teleological: The function of A in a system S with organization C is to enable 
S in environment E to engage in process F; 
Non-teleological: Every system S with organization C and in environment E 
engage in function F; if S with organization C and in environment E does not 
have A, then S cannot engage in F; hence, S must have A.  
The organization refers to the physiological structure of fish, the system to fish, the 
function to gills, process to breathing, and the environment to just some water with 
dissolved oxygen. The argument from functional reducibility can be formulated as 
follows. 
 (RED-P1) If any functional account of why a part in a biological organism 
emerges can be translated into an efficient causal account, teleology is redundant. 
 (RED-P2) Any functional account of why a part in a biological organism 
emerges can be translated into an efficient causal account. 
 Therefore, (RED-C) teleology is redundant. 
 P1 is problematic, I think, because the teleology it rejects is in a narrower 
scope than what Aristotelian natural teleology is supposed to be. Aristotelian 
teleology pertains to the whole organisms rather than its parts. The fish example 
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focuses on merely one part, one function. Even if we can find equivalent explanations 
for one part or function in an organism, it does not follow that we can do the same to 
the entire organism. This is a significant point. To see why, consider an analogy. 
 We have a soccer team. Every player in the field is trying to score as a team. 
So the goalkeeper kicks off. The right back passes to the left midfielder, who passes a 
chest-high ball to the center forward, who does a short cross pass. One striker takes 
the pass and does a triangular pass with teammates. Then there is a lobbing pass and 
the striker does an overhead kick scoring a goal. 
 Now, every player in the system is one part of the system. It seems that we 
can have an efficient causal explanation of each player’s move without any 
teleological content. But even if we can get that explanation, we still lack an account 
of why the whole team aims to score. That is not a question about why the last striker 
wants to score. Nor is about why the next individual player’s move depends on the 
previous individual player’s move (Toepfer 2012:116). That is a question about why 
the whole team moves the way it does such that the last one can be in that position to 
score. We may have an efficient causal account of parts without being able to make 
sense of the whole system unless we recognize the teleology of the team, which is to 
cooperate to score. 
 Nagel gives us an account that says in a non-teleological way why fish have 
gills. But Nagel has not told us why fish need to breathe at all. What Nagel gives us, 
at best, is that if fish need to breathe, fish must have gills. But Aristotle apparently 
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wants to say more. Aristotle wants to say that fish must breathe, because fish is a 
living thing and part of what it is for fish to live is for fish to breathe. 
 The proponent of the argument from functional reducibility might respond as 
follows. This argument from functional reducibility is supposed to offer a model. We 
illustrate this model with one part of a system. Once we get that, we can easily 
expand this model to the whole system. We just need to see the whole system as one 
big function. So here is a refined version of the argument to incorporate what 
Aristotle wants to say.  
(RRED-P1) If any account of why the whole system has the function it has 
can be translated into an efficient causal account, teleology is redundant. 
(RRED-P2) Any account of why the whole system has the function it has can 
be translated into an efficient causal account. 
Therefore, (RRED-C) teleology is redundant. 
Notice that in order for this argument to count against teleology, we have to read the 
word “function” in the argument as synonym of “essence” and “telos.”  So P2 is to be 
understood as this: there is an efficient causal account of why any organism has the 
essence it has.  
 Before asking whether RRED-P2 is true, we must be clear about what it takes 
to establish its truth. With the previous RED-P2, we can refer to some other parts 
within the system to construct an efficient causal account. But now that the function 
of the whole system is called into question, we can no longer appeal to any parts in 
that system. This reason is simple. We are asking after the efficient cause of the 
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function of something as large as the whole. This efficient cause must be sought 
outside the system. The parts in the system are called into question together with the 
system itself. We cannot appeal to parts as efficient cause of the whole system which 
has those parts, just as we cannot appeal to one player on a team to explain the 
function of the whole team which includes that very player. We must say, for 
example, that the coach of this team identifies the goal of the team as scoring as many 
as possible, since the coach is outside the team playing in the field. 
 But now it is unclear how RREC-P2 can be true. It is unclear how there can be 
any efficient causal account of why any organism has its essence that offers the same 
information as some teleological account. It is also unclear how such an account can 
be given. Suppose one can identify that efficient cause in something outside the 
system. Presumably this efficient cause is itself another biological organism, say, the 
parent. Then the question arises as to how this efficient cause has its essence. And the 
explanation will go backward to infinity. The result is some strong determinism that 
seems to square with neither evolutionary thinking nor Aristotelian essentialism. If P2 
in the expanded version of the argument from functional reducibility is unjustified, 
the argument is no good. 
 
  
Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. 47 
 
Chapter Four: Stimulating the Protectors 
With the major prosecutors struck, we now have a stronger confidence that COM-P2 
is true. Recall that  
(COM-P2) If Aristotelian essentialism can describe what is going on with 
species evolution, Aristotelian essentialism is compatible with species 
evolution. 
 Now there are protectors of Aristotelian natural teleology who might think, however, 
that everything said so far is just an unnecessarily roundabout way to establish 
Aristotelian essentialism. They claim to have arguments that defend Aristotelian 
natural teleology much more straightforwardly. Let us examine some major 
arguments that have been proposed to establish Aristotelian natural teleology more 
directly. I name this section “stimulating the protectors,” for I want to point out the 
inadequacy in each of the following protective arguments and draw protectors’ 
attention also to the significance of my proposal.  
 
A. The Argument from Goal-Directedness 
According to proponents of the argument from goal-directedness, Aristotelian 
teleology is not to be understood as the idea that the development of every organism 
is directed at a specific goal. Aristotelian teleology is rather the idea that the 
development of every organism has a goal-directedness without being directed at any 
specific goal. Goal-directedness intrinsically belongs to an organism such that the 
organism produces in itself whatever is necessary for survival. This goal-directedness 
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alone is supposed to show that teleology is true. The argument from goal-directedness 
can be formulated as follows. 
 (DIR-P1) If organisms have goal-directedness, teleology is true. 
 (DIR-P2) Organisms have goal-directedness. 
 Therefore, (DIR-C) teleology is true. 
It is a matter of definition and empirical evidence whether P2 is true. Under certain 
definition of “goal-directedness” it is more probable. Denis Walsh defines “goal-
directedness of organisms” as “the capacity to produce those structures and processes 
required for their vital functions” (2008:119). If we run with this definition, and if we 
acknowledge such capacity as a result of empirical observation, we would not find P2 
problematic. 
 But P2 is ambiguous. Its ambiguity does not stem from the vulnerability of 
any particular definition of goal-directedness. How can there be goal-directedness 
without there being some goal to be directed at? The argument takes a neat route by 
sidestepping this challenge. As a result, many prosecutors’ concerns which we met in 
the last section will not make sense. For example, if there can be teleology without 
there being goals, the argument from non-actuality is completely nonsensical. That 
objection is attacking the very idea that the presence of the goal will invoke backward 
causation that defies the temporal order of our universe. But to ignore the talk of 
goals is simply to make that concern disappear. Likewise, if there can be teleology 
without there being goals, the argument from normativity does not make sense either. 
That objection is attacking exactly the idea that goals cannot be normative. 
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Is it not a good thing that objections are neatly resolved? Yes, provided that 
the idea of there being goal-directedness without any goal can make sense to us. But 
there cannot be goal-directedness without reference to any goals (Nagel 1979:311-
312). To see why, consider an analogy. 
A group of people are going on the street for demonstration. We ask them, 
“where are you going?” They answer, “we are not going anywhere, but can’t you see 
that we are simply going?” A bit confused, we continue to ask, “Do you mean that 
you are going around?” They answer, “We are not going around, but we are going.”  
Now, we certainly see that they are going with legs and feet. We can even tell 
at this moment that they are crossing from Canal Street to Natural Bridge. But we 
cannot say that they have a destination, because they have no idea of where the 
destination is. 
Here is an objection, though. Is not their demonstration still teleological? It 
does not seem to matter where they go. All that matters seems to be that they are 
demonstrating whatever they want to demonstrate. And that is their goal. That goal is 
clearly directing the group wherever they are going. The whole thing is teleological. 
But this pushes the problem only a level back. Suppose we ask, “So what are 
you demonstrating?” In order for the goal-directedness-without-reference-to-goal 
strategy to work, they have to respond, “We do not know what we are demonstrating, 
but can’t you see that we are simply demonstrating?”  
Their question is tricky. I can see that they are demonstrating without 
knowing what they are demonstrating. The problem is, however, not whether I see or 
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know. The problem is whether, from an insider’s point of view, anyone in the group 
knows that they are demonstrating. So suppose I ask one of the demonstrators, “Do 
you have the slightest idea of what you are demonstrating?” The answer must again 
be No, since there must never be any reference to any specific goal. But at that point, 
does the person still know that they are demonstrating?  
One might say respond as follows. If I know that they are demonstrating, she 
must be able to know that they are demonstrating also. But the problem then becomes 
this: does the person know that she is demonstrating? 
I think the answer to this last question must be No. This person does not know 
whether she is demonstrating, even if she has confidence that she is among a group of 
people who are demonstrating. Demonstration is a kind of activity such that if one 
does not know what one is demonstrating (goal), one is not participating in the 
demonstration. One can be walking with others, shouting with others, but that does 
not count as demonstration.  
But then another objection comes. What about eating? Anyone can eat 
something without knowing what is being eaten, or what the goal of eating is. Why 
pick up demonstration particularly? 
Yet this is not an objection. The point of my analogy is not to show it is not 
possible to do something without knowing its content. To read my analogy that way 
is to totally misinterpret it. The point of my analogy is show that if you are doing 
something without having the slightest idea of the goal, your action is not teleological 
for you. So you could be eating without knowing the goal of eating, but then your 
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eating is just not teleological. It can be biologically necessary or beneficial, but just 
not teleological. Because of the ambiguity in P2, the argument from goal-directedness 
does not work.  
 
B. The Argument from Wellbeing 
The argument from wellbeing can be seen as a response to our discussion of the 
argument from goal-directedness. I have argued that there is no goal-directedness 
without reference to some goals. Now here is a strategy to meet my challenge: let 
there be some goal and let us define it in a non-specific way. Still, make sure it is a 
goal that an organism can be said to pursue. This goal is “wellbeing.” So it is not the 
case that organisms have no goals to be goal-directed at, but it is also not the case that 
organisms have goals as specific as species essences. Rather, an organism has a 
general goal towards wellbeing, or in Darwinian terms, towards the overall 
reproductive success (Ayala 1970:11), though it is entirely debatable whether the 
Aristotelian wellbeing just is Darwinian survival (Depew 2008:381). The idea is that 
once we identify the goal as wellbeing, we have teleology. The argument from 
wellbeing can be formulated as follows. 
 (WEL-P1) If organisms are goal-directed at wellbeing, teleology is true. 
 (WEL-P2) Organisms are goal-directed at wellbeing. 
 Therefore, (WEL-C) teleology is true. 
Both evolutionary theorists and Aristotelians would agree with P2. But is not P1 
trivially true? Even if we grant P1, what kind of teleology is being established by the 
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argument? To me, P1 is silent on how to differentiate the telos of one species from 
another. According to the teleology established here, the telos of one organism will be 
the same as the telos any other organism, regardless of whether the two organisms 
belong to the same species. This teleology is unable to differentiate species forms. 
Perhaps the pitfall lies in understanding the wellbeing of an organism simply 
in Darwinian terms of survival. Aristotelian wellbeing must go beyond mere survival. 
Aristotelian wellbeing must be tailored to and sensitive to a specific kind of species, 
that is, an essence. To talk about wellbeing of organisms generally is just to use the 
term “wellbeing” in a thin sense. 
But to specify what kind of wellbeing relative to each kind of species will 
make almost the entire weight of the argument fall upon P2. Given the right definition 
of wellbeing relative to essences, P1 would seem trivially true. Consider the refined 
version of the argument from wellbeing. 
 (RWEL-P1) If organisms are goal-directed at wellbeing relative to species, 
teleology is true. 
 (RWEL-P2) Organisms are goal-directed at wellbeing relative to species. 
 Therefore, (RWEL-C) teleology is true. 
Notice, however, that if wellbeing becomes species-indexed, the argument has clearly 
departed from its initial motive. The initial motive of the argument from wellbeing 
was to define some goal in a non-specific way. This goal was found to be wellbeing 
of organisms regardless of species essences. Thus to make wellbeing species-indexed 
at this later stage will betray the motive of the argument. 
Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. 53 
 
 Even if we consider the refined argument from wellbeing in its own right, the 
argument does not seem convincing. RWEL-P2 begs the question of whether 
teleology is true. If teleology were false, there would be no essences guiding the 
biological development. Consequently, there cannot be any wellbeing relative to 
essences, since essences themselves do not exist.  According to Aristotelian 
essentialism, the concept of species entails the concept of species essences. If there 
cannot be wellbeing relative to essences, there cannot be wellbeing relative to species 
either. Hence the very concept “wellbeing relative to species” in RWEL-P2 depends 
for its legitimacy on the truth of teleology. One has to accept the conclusion first in 
order to see the truth of RWEL-P2. The refine argument from wellbeing therefore 
fails as it is subject to vicious circularity. 
 My multiple-potentiality strategy is alarmingly relevant here. If biological 
matter has multiple potentialities such that the matter can change from being 
potentially one thing to being potentially another thing, we have got exactly the 
flexibility desired by proponents of the argument from wellbeing. Yet the flexibility 
we have is not as vague as some general notion of biological wellbeing that leaves 
species essences out of sight. According to my multiple-potentiality strategy, an 
organism is goal-directed at a specific essence while this goal can change as a result 
of change in the arrangement of fundamental particles. This flexibility is good news 
for proponents of the argument from wellbeing, because they share with proponents 
of the argument from goal-directedness the same concern that Aristotelian natural 
teleology must not be stiff regarding the goals. Otherwise, fixity of species does not 
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square with evolution. Since I see the argument from wellbeing as a response to my 
critique of the argument from goal-directedness, the flexibility granted by my 
multiple-potentiality strategy should also be reasonably favored by proponents of the 
argument from goal-directedness. 
 
C. The Argument from Discernibility 
The argument from discernibility for Aristotelian natural teleology comes from 
Robert Friedman. To illustrate, Friedman introduces a “principle of indiscernibility of 
identicals”: “An individual necessitarian explanation can render an individual 
teleological explanation straightforwardly superfluous only if the two explanations 
are explanations of the same thing” (1986:357). Here a “necessitarian explanation” 
should be understood as a mechanistic efficient causal explanation. If a teleological 
explanation and a necessitarian explanation explain the same explanandum, the 
teleological explanation is not doing any work. 
It seems that this principle by itself is unfair to teleology. If a teleological 
explanation and a necessitarian explanation explain the same explanandum, it may 
well be that the necessitarian explanation is not doing any work. One should not 
reject teleology simply on the grounds that something else explains what teleology 
explains. But let us grant Friedman’s principle and its implication. 
Friedman cautions that his principle apparently contradicts Aristotle’s saying 
that “it is possible for the same thing (to auto) to be the case both with some aim and 
from necessity.”  (PA II 11, 94b27-28) So Friedman poses a further question: in what 
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sense of the word “same” do teleological explanation and necessitarian explanation 
explain the same thing (1986:357)? Friedman differentiates two senses of “sameness”: 
Strong Sameness: the sameness expressed in the principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals.  
Weak Sameness: coincidental or accidental sameness.  
Things “weakly” the same can be different according to the sameness in the principle 
of the indiscernibility of identicals. “Weakly same” things may not be “strongly same” 
(Friedman 1986:357). To illustrate, Friedman’s example is worth quoting in full: 
Water birds have webbed feet because having webbed feet aids them in their 
daily lives by making it easy for them to swim (PA IV 12, 694
a
22-b9). That is 
the purpose webbed feet serve. But they also have their webbed feet of 
necessity. How so? Earthy substance courses along in a bird’s body. It courses 
downward, then in some cases it fills in the spaces between the bird’s toes. 
(That seems to be the easy place to go.) Now the webs are coincidentally the 
same as the earthy things. Whereas one might argue it is necessary that some 
earthy thing form on the bird’s feet, they need not be webs. Perhaps they 
could be just huge useless lumps. The present point seems to conflict with the 
claim that the birds have their webbed feet of necessity. The teleological 
explanation in this passage is an example in which a phenomenon is explained 
as belonging to a set of options, one of which is (hypothetically) necessary for 
an end. Teleological explanation, far from being mere window-dressing, tells 
us why water birds have webs on their feet instead of useless earthy growths. 
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Thus we see that what necessity and teleology explain is not the same thing in 
the strong sense required by the indiscernibility of identical. (1986:359-360) 
The significance of this example can never be overemphasized. The thing to be 
explained here is apparently one fact: water birds have webbed feet. Friedman says 
that water birds have webbed feet because of both teleology and necessity. Having 
webbed feet is teleological because having webbed feet helps water birds live well by 
making swimming easy. Having webbed feet is also necessary because having 
webbed feet happens as a result of “earthy substance” coursing downward. Clearly 
the teleological explanation explains the occurrence of webbedness, whereas the 
necessitarian explanation explains the occurrence of feet. Nevertheless webbedness 
and feet coincidentally come together in one thing, namely, the constitutive matter of 
the webbed feet. Hence although it appears that both the teleological explanation and 
the necessitarian explanation explain the same thing “webbed feet,” in fact what they 
explain are weakly the same.  
Let us consider the case counterfactually. Suppose teleology does not exist 
and hence the teleological explanation is superfluous. There would then be “a set of 
options” open to water birds regarding the exact shape of their feet. But there would 
be no basis for any one option to be developed. Given teleology, however, 
Aristotelian essentialists can almost be sure that the webbed feet will get developed. 
 An objection can be raised at this point. There are things in Friedman’s 
account, such as webbedness, that are not taken care of by teleology. There are things, 
of course, that are taken care of by teleology. This difference renders the 
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explanandum not “strongly” the same according to the principle of indiscernibility of 
identicals. But this difference only allows Friedman to say within an individual 
account that the thing taken care of by teleology shows that teleological explanation 
is not superfluous. The benefit unfortunately goes only this far. Once we go beyond 
that individual account, we encounter possibilities in which things taken care of by 
teleology in that individual account is still necessitated in another account. This 
suffices to make the previous teleological explanation superfluous. To see how, 
notice that Friedman has not ruled out the possibility that there can be some 
necessitarian explanation for webbedness. After all, webbedness is just a physical 
shape of the water birds’ feet. Necessitarian explanations that can explain physical 
shapes should not be hard to formulate. Indeed, prosecutors holding to the functional 
reducibility argument will likely maintain that there will be an efficient causal 
mechanism that explains the webbedness of the water birds’ feet as well as any 
teleological explanation. 
  The real problem for Friedman is therefore that he allows some biological 
features to develop out of necessity regardless of teleology, thus making Aristotelian 
essences lose grip on those features. Opponents would thereby push Friedman one 
step further, arguing that everything can be explained by necessitarian explanations. 
If this is the real problem for Friedman, the real solution must be to explain every 
biological feature within a teleological framework, that is, to let teleology permeate 
every possible explanandum. Aristotelian essences must guide the entire biological 
development to every detail. 
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 Protectors holding to the argument from discernibility will find relief in the 
multiple-potentiality strategy I proposed. There is deep resonance between their 
approach and mine. Essential to the argument from discernibility is the idea that “a 
set of options” regarding certain physiological features are available to the biological 
matter and teleology alone can decide which one is the best for an organism that 
belongs to a certain species. Admittedly, “a set of options” here does not strictly mean 
“multiple potentialities” in the sense I explicated. It seems more like that on each 
potentiality-actuality track, there will be a set of options regarding every 
physiological feature. But this should not prevent these protectors from, but rather 
should provoke them to, thinking one step further that there might multiple 
potentialities in the first place. The teleology and Aristotelian essentialism I explicate 
is just more thoroughgoing. 
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Chapter Five: Summarizing the Position 
Aristotle’s essentialism is compatible with species evolution. We have departed from 
property essentialism in order to search for a teleological conception of Aristotle’s 
essentialism in terms of matter and form as potentiality and actuality. An Aristotelian 
essence should be conceived as a form or an actuality. It pertains to not only positive 
properties traditionally conceived as essential properties, but also a range of 
proximate potentialities. Species evolve just in case the essence of old species is 
replaced by the essence of new species. In order for a change in essences as forms or 
actualities to be possible, it is natural to suppose that a change in potentialities must 
be possible in the first place. 
I have explored precisely this possibility by proposing that the constitutive 
matter of living things have multiple potentialities. Changes in the spatial 
arrangement of subatomic fundamental particles can generate changes in atoms, 
which can generate genetic changes that may cause a change in the potentiality of 
matter. New essences occur more frequently than new biologically recognized species 
occur. 
Given this multiple-potentiality strategy, we have a way to describe what is 
going on with species evolution. Species evolve just in case the ways in which 
fundamental particles of the constitutive matter of living things change to the effect 
that a new potentiality of the constitutive matter comes into being. The organism is 
now on the road to, and under the guidance of, a new essence, which makes the 
organism a member of a new species. I have noted that the essences have existed all 
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along, yet it needs a first instantiation to be actually fulfilled in our world. My 
distinction between proximate potentiality and remote potentiality has illuminated the 
multiple-potentiality strategy. 
Since we can describe what is going on with species evolution in terms of 
Aristotelian essentialism, I have taken the first premise in my compatibility argument 
to be true or at least very probable. The second premise in my compatibility argument 
is that the truth of the first premise shows that species evolution is compatible with 
Aristotelian essentialism. I have cautioned that the second premise is philosophically 
interesting only if species evolution is “strongly” compatible with Aristotelian 
essentialism. I have examined three counter-arguments––the argument from non-
actuality, the argument from randomness and the argument from functional 
reducibility––to show that the main reasons to deny the non-trivial reading of the 
second premise are not good. That makes my second premise very probable. 
I have also provoked supporters of my compatibility thesis, who take 
alternative routes, to think more carefully about their arguments. I have showed that 
three arguments––the argument from goal-directedness, the argument from wellbeing 
and the argument from discernibility––that aim to defense Aristotelian essentialism 
are inadequate. Yet my multiple-potentiality strategy can enhance these arguments in 
support of the compatibility thesis. 
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